My PhD research is about existence concepts in the works of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. More specifically, I aim to develop a clear picture of the various positions they held and how these are related. I argue, for instance, that Frege's account of singular existentials has generally been misunderstood and that Russell's theory of denoting concepts in Principles of Mathematics is incompatible with a relatively moderate ontology.
I have also worked on ontological pluralism, the ontology of fictional characters, the ontology and epistemology of musical works, expressive limitations of two-dimensional modal logic and neo-Carnapian metaontology, among various other topics in the philosophy of language, metaphysics and logic.
Forthcoming. Ways of being have no way of being useful. Thought.
2017. Fictional realism and metaphysically indeterminate identity. Analysis 77: 551--19.